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Abstract 
Constructivism has brought changes in cognitive therapy, including Rational-
Emotive Therapy, in recent years. The benefits of constructivism in cognitive ther-
apy include a stronger tie with personality theory, greater appreciation of 
contextual factors affecting individual clients, and opportunities for considering reli-
gious values in therapy. The major liability of constructivism is that it allows little 
room for external sources of authority. A Christian hermeneutic is presented which 
allows cognitive therapists to enjoy the benefits of constructivism within a world-
view that asserts authoritative boundaries. Clinical implications are discussed. 
Therapies and therapists change with time. Personal maturation and changing 
social tides affect clinical style, alter theoretical frameworks, and modify the nature 
of interventions. When Albert Ellis, founder of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET), 
wrote his Case Against Religion in 1971 , it would have seemed inconceivable that 
22 years later the same author would conclude: 
I think that I can safely say that the Judea-Christian Bible is a 
self-help book that has probably enabled more people to make 
more extensive and intensive personality and behavioral 
changes than all professional therapists combined. (Ellis, 
1993a, p. 336) 
This change, though dismissed as minimal by Ellis himself (Ellis, 1992a), reflects a 
broader change within psychology that leaves more room for religion than was pre-
sent two decades ago (see Bergin, 1980, 1991; Jones, 1994). The move away 
from the rationalist and positivist approaches, often associated with anti-religious 
sentiments, and toward the postmodern, constructivist approaches has made it 
possible to consider religion and psychology in the same context. 
Whereas the old positivist paradigm emphasized "truth" as discovered in sci-
ence, constructivist views emphasize human values and context as an integral part 
of knowing truth. As faith in an objective science wanes, we are witnessing "softer" 
research methodologies (Howard, 1993) as well as evolving models of therapy 
(Neimeyer, 1993). In early days of cognitive therapy, the therapist was seen as an 
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objective observer of clients' irrational thinking, and had the job of correcting the 
clients' faulty cognitions. In contemporary cognitive therapy, the therapist is a "co-
constructivist" (Meichenbaum, 1993, p. 203), collaborating with the client to 
transform the narrative of her or his life. 
There are many benefits of this changing philosophy of science among Christian 
psychologists, especially because it has allowed an integration movement to flour-
ish. Moreover, constructivist cognitive therapy has allowed for a greater awareness 
of childhood and interpersonal factors than earlier forms of cognitive therapy (see 
McMinn, 1991, 1992; Ryle, 1990; Safran & Segal, 1990). Nonetheless, it is con-
structivism, with its many benefits, that causes me some concern when evaluating 
the cognitive therapies, including Rational-Emotive Therapy. In this paper I will 
consider the benefits and liabilities of constructivist cognitive therapies, and con-
clude by considering the merits of a specific hermeneutic for a Christian form of 
cognitive therapy. 
RET and Constructivism 
Constructivism, in its many forms, emphasizes the construed nature of reality. 
For example, a frustrated driver on a crowded freeway constructs an interpretation 
of the situation. Is it the situation or the constructed interpretation that is most rele-
vant to the driver? Radical constructivists view reality as an internal, perceptual 
process rather than an objective set of events (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 
1992), and would likely conclude that the perception of the driver is the only reality 
that can be known. Rationalism stands in stark opposition, suggesting that the driv-
er can reduce frustration by being more objective in interpreting the situation 
(implying that reality is separate from the driver's perceptions). If a client's memo-
ries of the past or perceptions of the present are fictional, the rationalist would be 
more concerned than the constructivist: rationalists view accuracy as important for 
mental health whereas constructivists see the inner phenomenal world of the client 
to be most important. Between these two extremes are moderate forms of con-
structivism that emphasize the mind's ability to actively construct reality while still 
maintaining the existence and relevance of objective reality. 
There is little doubt that cognitive therapies are moving toward constructivism 
(Guidano, 1991; Mahoney, 1991, 1993; Meichenbaum, 1993; Neimeyer, 1993), but 
it is less clear whether RET is best described as rationalist or constructivist. 
Mahoney has argued that RET is the prototype of rationalist cognitive therapy 
(Mahoney, 1988a, 1993; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987), an assertion largely support-
ed by Wessler (1992). Those who see RET as rationalist focus on Ellis' insistence 
that certain ways of thinking are faulty and inaccurate and inevitably lead people to 
upset themselves. For example, when Ellis (1962) writes, the "concept of sin is the 
direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance" (p. 146), he implies 
that a dogmatically religious way of thinking is wrong and that his "rational" ways of 
thinking are better. The guilty, religious client might report, "I was wrong to be 
unfaithful to my spouse," to which the traditional RET therapist might respond, 
"Prove to me, logically, that having sex with someone else is unfaithfulness, and 
even if it is, prove to me that you have anything to feel bad about." Thus, RET often 
assumes an "objective reality," as defined by the values of the RET therapist, and 
has epistemological ties with rationalism and logical positivism (Rorer, 1991; 
Wilber, 1989) because only that which can be logically or scientifically proven is 
accepted by the therapist as a legitimate way of thinking. At times, Ellis makes 
statements that link him to his positivist roots. For example, 
And, 
... if people rigorously use the scientific method and if they 
think only in terms of preferences and desires instead of ... 
antiscientific thinking, they will ... virtually never make themselves 
seriously neurotic. (Ellis, 1986, p. 148) 
I believe there is no God and there are no devils. I don't believe 
that that can be absolutely proved, but that since the probability 
of any superhuman existence is about .0000001 or less, I 
choose to believe that He or She does not exist, until someone 
shows me empirical evidence to the contrary. (Ell is quoted in 
Weinrach, 1980, p. 158) 
Although others see RET as positivist and rationalist, Ellis insists that RET is based 
on constructivism (Ellis, 1988, 1993b). Although he acknowledges that RET was ini-
tially developed in the days of logical positivism (Ellis, 1992b, 1993b), Ellis reports 
that RET was never rationalist or positivist because it has always been rooted in 
humanistic and existential theory (Ellis, 1993b). According to Ellis, as RET has 
evolved (Ellis now calls it preferential RET) , it has become increasingly construc-
tivist. Ellis (1993b) offers evidence that RET is "distinctly constructivist and humanis-
tic" (p. 199). First, RET maintains that humans construct (and therefore can 
reconstruct) personal demands and "musts," and then experience the emotional 
consequences of their constructs. Second, humans construct an interpretation of 
how others are responding or should respond, then because they are innately cre-
ative they are able to evaluate and change their dysfunctional and self-defeating 
thinking. Third, though RET is usually described by its cognitive focus, it is and 
always has been multimodal. Rational-Emotive therapists recognize that feelings 
and behaviors affect thoughts just as thoughts affect feelings and behaviors, and 
often work to evoke emotions in therapy. 
Is RET constructivist or rationalist? Wessler (1992) concludes that "RET can 
appear constructivistic or rationalistic depending on where you look" (p. 624). 
Those describing it as rationalist focus on the techniques of RET therapists, and the 
implicit assumption that the therapist is more rational and logical than the client. 
Although many of the techniques of RET and many of the quotes made by its 
founder appear rationalistic and positivistic, the theory that underlies RET leaves 
ample room for constructivism. Theoretically, RET has more depth than critics imply 
when they reduce RET to a therapist insisting a client conform to the therapist's way 
of thinking. Indeed, the closest theoretical relative to RET may be humanistic psy-
chology, the ''third force" in psychology that helped usher in the values of construc-
tivism and phenomenology in the 1960s and 70s. Ellis identifies himself (1980) and 
RET (1993b) as humanistic, then adds: 
Unlike Carl Rogers and other existential therapists, who believe 
that unconditional positive regard can be given by the therapist's 
modeling it and accepting clients unconditionally, RET practitioners 
try to give this kind of acceptance to all clients but also teach them 
how to give it to themselves. In this way, RET is both humanistic-
existential and didactic and active-directive. (1993b, p. 200) 
Thus, on a theoretical level it seems reasonable to view RET as constructivist 
(Wessler, 1992). RET therapists attempt to teach clients to experience peace and 
freedom by re~onstructing their thoughts in ways that reduce unnecessary 
demands from self and others. 
Benefits of Constructivism in Cognitive Therapy 
The rise in constructivism has affected the practice of RET and other cognitive 
therapies, and many of these changes have helped compensate for longstanding 
weaknesses in the cognitive therapies. First, cognitive therapies have traditionally 
been weakly tied to underlying personality theories. Both Albert Ellis and Aaron 
Beck rebelled from their psychodynamic training in favor of their techniques which 
appeared to work more quickly than traditional insight-oriented therapy, so in a 
sense their therapies were pragmatically-derived and almost void of theory. The 
theory most often identified to support cognitive therapy is information processing 
theory, coming from experimental cognitive psychology in the 1960s (Meichen-
baum, 1993; Safran & Segal, 1990). Information processing theory traces a linear 
route of information through human sensory and cognitive processes. This same 
information processing model is often used in RET to interpret emotional experi-
ences. Some activating event (A) happens, followed by a belief (B), and a conse-
quent emotion (c) . Safran and Segal (1990) direct cogent criticism toward an 
information processing model for cognitive therapy because it lacks real-world 
validity (Neisser, 1982), it incorrectly portrays humans as passive accumulators of 
information, it ignores the social milieu and motivational factors, and it relegates 
emotions to post-cognitive phenomena (Lazarus, 1982, 1984; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). 
Jones and Butman (1991) raise similar concerns in their critique of cognitive ther-
apy from a Christian perspective: 
... one is left with a clear sense that there is much more to 
human beings than cognitive-behavioral therapy would lead us 
to believe. Where is transcendence and spirituality? How do we 
understand self-deception or evil? Does this view really plumb 
the profound depths of relationships and the terrific impact we 
have on one another? Isn't emotion more than the output of 
cognitive habits? What about conflict within the person; isn't this 
inevitable and indeed helpful to us understanding what it means 
to be truly human? How are we to grow? Are there any impor-
tant regularities to the way we develop as human beings? Cog-
nitive-behavioral therapy's silence on each of these questions is 
disconcerting. (pp. 222-223) 
Constructivism has opened doors for alternative personality models that include 
a richer understanding of developmental, interpersonal, and social factors. For 
example, Safran and Segal (1990) describe a form of interpersonal cognitive ther-
apy that builds upon Bowlby's (1969, 1973, 1980) attachment theory and Green-
berg and Safran's ( 1987) emotion theory. Other constructivist therapies have 
juxtaposed cognitive processes with object relations theory (Ryle, 1990), self psy-
chology (Guidano, 1991 ), narrative psychology (Mair, 1988), and systems theory 
(Guidano, 1988; Hoffman, 1988). These works attempt to integrate a rich tradition 
of well-developed personality theory with cognitive change procedures. 
Second, although cognitive therapies have traditionally emphasized the present, 
constructivism requires a fuller understanding of contextual information, and thus a 
heightened awareness of the client's past (McMinn, 1991, 1 992; Neimeyer, 1 993). 
As constructivism has gained momentum, cognitive therapists have become inter-
ested in deep cognitive structures called schemas (Beck, Freeman, & Associates, 
1 990; Young, 1990). Schemas are closely linked to the psychodynamic under-
standing of narrative (Russell & Van den Broek, 1 992), and thus to a careful under-
standing of a client's perceptions of the past. Donald Meichenbaum (1993), a 
pioneer in cognitive-behavioral therapy, now identifies constructive narrative as the 
metaphor guiding the cognitive therapies. In this sense, the cognitive therapies are 
becoming more and more similar to psychodynamic therapies (Arkowitz & Hannah, 
1989; Mahoney, 1988b), and have played a major role in the movement to inte-
grate different theories of psychotherapy (Mahoney, 1993). 
Third, constructivism has moved the focus of cognitive therapy beyond the indi-
vidual and toward a systemic perspective (Neimeyer, 1993). An individualistic 
approach to therapy is overly simplistic and ignores the importance of the social 
milieu. For example, Safran and Segal (1990) note that depression is often precipi-
tated by marital conflict, marital conflict contributes to depression, and depression 
contributes to marital stress. Thus, dealing with the isolated cognitions of the indi-
vidual is unlikely to produce long-term effects for many forms of depression. 
Fourth, constructivism has changed the role of the cognitive therapist from being 
a skilled, directive technician to being reflective and "intensely personal" (Neimey-
er, 1993, p. 225). The psychotherapy relationship has become a source of data for 
the cognitive therapist, much as it always has been for the psychodynamic thera-
pist. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the relational aspects of successful 
cognitive therapy share important similarities with brief psychodynamic therapy 
(Jones & Pulos, 1993), and that the therapeutic relationship is more closely related 
to positive outcome than other variables studied to date (Whiston & Sexton, 1993). 
Mahoney (1993) summarizes the effects of constructivism on the cognitive 
therapies: 
Whereas early cognitive therapies were relatively more intro-
spective, individualistic, ahistorical, and inattentive to the emo-
tional relationship between counselor and client, the opposite of 
each of these is more characteristic of contemporary cognitive 
psychotherapies. (p. 190) 
In addition to these four changes, postmodernism and constructivism have 
opened the door for the integration of religion and psychotherapy (Jones, 1994). 
When psychotherapy was bound by positivism, religion was considered unrelated, 
even irrelevant, to the methods of clinical psychology, but with constructivism has 
come a number of efforts to blend Christian thought with cognitive therapy, espe-
cially Rational-Emotive Therapy. These Christianized forms of RET (DiGiuseppe, 
Robin, & Dryden, 1990; Hauck, 1972, 1985; Johnson, 1992, 1993; Johnson & Rid-
ley, 1992; Lawrence, 1987; Lawrence & Huber, 1982; Powell, 1976; Warnock, 
1989), and Ellis' relatively gracious reception of them would not be possible if RET 
were completely rooted in positivism or in Ellis' version of rationalism (which he 
described in 1980 as probabilistic atheism). That is, if RET were exclusively rational-
ist, then only those thoughts that Ellis finds acceptable would be endorsed as 
appropriate for RET. This is not the case. Indeed, Ellis has given guarded praise for 
some forms of Christianized RET (see Ellis, 1989, 1992b; Weinrach, 1980}. 
Liabilities of Constructivism in Cognitive Therapy 
Although Christians have benefitted from constructivism as religious models of 
RET have been developed, constructivism also has liabilities that Christian thera-
pists would be wise to consider when evaluating therapeutic methods and goals. 
These liabilities emanate from the central thesis of radical forms of constructivism: 
that our notion of objective reality be discarded and replaced by understanding the 
phenomenal reality of the individual. 
The constructivist position implies that a person's version of 
reality cannot be tested by objective criteria, tor there are none; 
instead, a criterion of utility is applied: is the person's version of 
reality useful in living in the world? (Wessler, 1992, p. 620} 
This assumption is precisely what Ellis has advocated in his arguments against 
religion (Ellis, 1971, 1980, 1983}, suggesting that religious people would do well to 
"give up all absolutistic thinking and stop making themselves emotionally dis-
turbed" (Ellis, 1980, p. 637}. Thus, I am inclined to agree with Ellis that RET has 
always been constructivist and has become increasingly so as science has moved 
away from positivism. Moreover, non-dogmatic religious forms of RET have been 
tolerated by Ellis because they can easily be adapted to this constructivist world-
view and used with religious clients, regardless of the religious values of the thera-
pist (see Young, 1984a, b) . Before importing the RET world-view further into 
Christian forms of cognitive therapy, however, it is important to consider carefully 
the implications of constructivist assumptions of phenomenal reality. 
First, though constructivism is sometimes seen as an antidote to psychother-
apy's traditional overemphasis on individualism (Safran & Segal, 1990}, it also 
introduces a subtle, and perhaps more pernicious, form of individualism. In deter-
ministic forms of behaviorism, rationalism, and psychoanalysis, therapy was often 
focused on the individual to the exclusion of the social system in which he or she 
lived, leading to a narrow view of the causes of pathology and poor generalization 
of therapeutic gains. We could call this naive individualism. Constructivism has 
compensated for naive individualism by adding a social context to the focus of 
therapy, encouraging clients to create narratives that include multiple actors, and 
often by treating more than one individual at a time. These are helpful changes. 
But at the same time as constructivism alleviates naive individualism, it creates or 
perpetuates another form of individualism which places the primary locus of 
authority within the individual. We could call this ethical individualism. Imagine, for 
example, asking a sample of people where they find truth. In earlier days they 
might have reported sources of truth that include parents, the Bible, science, 
humanities, the Church, cultural mores, or God. But in our postmodern era of con-
structivism, the obvious answer is self: "I find truth by looking inside myself." To the 
radical constructivist, perceived reality is reality . 
. . . constructivist critics have begun to undermine people's tradi-
tional faith in their quest for the "timeless truths" embodied in 
social charters, cultural mores, masterworks of literature, educa-
tional curricula, and even science itself. (Neimeyer, 1993, p. 221} 
Even in the midst of considering social influences and contextual factors, con-
structivist psychotherapists (Christian or not) may unwittingly promote ethical 
individualism in their clients. 
In response to the unfaithful spouse mentioned earlier, a constructivist thera-
pist might ask, "What are your values regarding sex outside of marriage?" This is 
a better alternative than a therapist assuming values the client may not have, 
because it is sensitive to the client's cultural context and allows the client the dig-
nity of expressing and examining his or her own valuEjlS. However, the danger in 
the therapist's response is that the client might easily' assume his or her values 
to be the correct or proper values. The pervasive cognitive distortion of construc-
tivism is, "This value is right, because I believe it is right." 
Many RET therapists embrace ethical individualism as the desired goal. Ellis 
writes, "The emotionally healthy individual should primarily be true to himself and 
not masochistically sacrifice himself for others" (1971, p. 3; see also Ellis & 
Schoenfeld, 1990). Many other therapists, including most Christian therapists, will 
undoubtedly identify the atomistic view of self as problematic (see Jones, 1989). A 
biblical anthropology clearly requires Christians to view the human condition by 
ethical and moral standards that transcend individual concerns (Anderson, 1992). 
Second, as Christian therapists attempt to integrate religious constructs such as 
forgiveness and restitution into therapy (Worthington, 1993), veracity of memory 
becomes important. The constructivist therapist is less concerned with the external 
validity of a memory than with the internal effect of the memory (Neimeyer, 1993). 
For the client remembering childhood abuse, it may be helpful to fit those memo-
ries into a coherent narrative and to retell the story until it has an ending that leads 
to feelings of hope and self-efficacy, but it may be equally important to determine 
the veracity of those memories before efforts of forgiveness or reconciliation are 
made, or before requests for restitution are made. Perhaps the concern about 
False Memory Syndrome and the contemporary controversy about inaccurate con-
struction of false memories have been fueled by some constructivist therapists' 
lack of concern for external validity. 
Third, the direction of therapy for the constructivist RET therapist and the Chris-
tian therapist may be mutually exclusive at times. The constructivists' preference 
for narrative usually (though not always) assumes the client takes the role of pro-
tagonist-the hero of the story. The Christian narrative includes God, not self, as 
the central figure, and therefore focuses on self-denial and yielding to divine 
authority more than self-direction, self-fulfillment, and personal control. Ellis (1971) 
notes, correctly I believe, that "religion ... is self-abasement and self-abnega-
tion-as, of course, virtually all the saints and mystics have clearly stated that it is" 
(p. 11 ). Likewise, Ellis and Schoenfeld (1990) criticize the 12-step programs for 
their teaching regarding a Higher Power:" ... teaching patients they can only recov-
er through the intervention of a Higher Power locks them into a pattern of depen-
dence on something outside themselves in order to function" (p. 459). Thus, the 
goals of constructivist RET and Christian maturity may, at times, be in direct conflict. 
Vitz (1992) advocates narrative structures for Christian psychology, but carefully 
distinguishes between his ideas of narrative (which he describes as typical of pre-
modern thinking) and the contemporary postmodern ideas of narrative that are 
largely "secular and atheistic" (p. 26). 
In sum, the contemporary movement toward constructivist cognitive therapies 
leaves little or no room for external authority. The philosophical goal of RET is to 
move people toward greater reliance on themselves (Ellis, 1993b) whereas the goal 
of Christian maturity is to rely more fully on God. It is disconcerting that many Chris-
tian versions and defenses of RET (Hauck, 1985; Johnson & Ridley, 1992; Lawrence 
& Huber, 1982; Warnock, 1989) focus on similarity of techniques while overlooking 
the fundamental incompatibilities in world-view. Lawrence and Huber describe RET 
as "perhaps the most compatible with biblical teaching of all current major psy-
chotherapeutic systems" (p. 210). Elsewhere, Lawrence (1987) concludes that "RET 
is based on a thoroughly biblical principle, the importance of what one thinks" (p. 
19). Although an extreme example, this is analogous to saying lust and contempla-
tive prayer are alike because both are primarily driven by cognitions. 
Beyond looking for compatibility of techniques, some have looked for compatibili-
ties between the RET and Christian worldviews. DiGiuseppe, Robin, and Dryden 
(1990) assert that the compatibility between RET and Christianity "exists because 
rational-emotive therapy works to change core philosophical beliefs, and religious 
clients who are disturbed have typically misconstrued some of the philosophical 
core of their religious beliefs" (p. 366). They are undoubtedly correct that many reli-
gious clients have misconstrued the core of their religious beliefs, but it does not 
necessarily follow that RET will provide a better philosophical core. Only as Chris-
tians acknowledge the fundamental incompatibilities between RET and Christianity 
(see Johnson, 1992) can we work together to develop a form of cognitive therapy 
based on a Christian world-view (Wessler, 1984). 
Toward a Hermeneutic for Christian Cognitive Therapy 
If, as I have suggested, the constructivist approach to cognitive therapy has both 
benefits and liabilities for Christian psychology, the challenge is to find an adequate 
epistemological framework upon which a Christian cognitive therapy can be built. 
Although it would be unwise to uncritically accept the constructivism implicit in RET, 
it would be equally unwise to reject it altogether, returning to a Christianized form 
of rationalism. Therapists who proclaim, "This is true because God says it is true," 
will find it difficult to maintain credibility and establish good therapeutic rapport in a 
pluralistic culture comprised of people with diverse religious values (McMinn, 1984; 
McMinn & Lebold, 1989). Just as Christian critics of RET dislike the hedonistic value 
assertions popularized by Ellis, critics of Christian therapy will react to unsupported 
theistic value assertions. Furthermore, the many merits of constructivism would be 
lost if Christian therapists returned to a rationalist basis for therapy. 
How much constructivism can a Christian therapist embrace without compromis-
ing the objective nature of Christian truth or falling prey to haphazard relativism? 
That is, what hermeneutic scheme do Christian therapists use to understand both 
foundational truth and constructed meanings? Hermeneutics is a term originally 
used by biblical scholars in translating and interpreting sacred texts (Mahoney, 
1993). The biblical scholar interprets the Bible as text, valuing both the authorita-
tive nature of Scripture and the reality that all interpretations are ultimately human 
constructions to better understand the meaning of Scripture. Similarly, the Christian 
therapist interprets a client's life story as text, valuing both the events in the client's 
life and the interpretive processes the client and therapist use to understand those 
events. The task of Christian therapy is further complicated because we interpret 
multiple texts-the client's life events, life events of other people in the client's 
social system, Scripture, Christian and denominational traditions, the nature of 
God, scientific findings, and so on. 
Christian cognitive therapists are wise to question a radical hermeneutic of con-
structivism that suggests all reality is subjectively created. Whereas radical con-
structivists view all reality as construed, placing the therapist and client in the role 
of co-constructors of a narrative (Meichenbaum, 1993), a view more compatible 
with Christian thought is to view reality as interpreted, placing the therapist and 
client in the role of co-interpreters of a life story. In radical constructivism, therapist 
and client construct a script. In this more measured form of constructivism, thera-
pist and client interpret a script. For the biblical scholar, this would be analogous to 
the difference between writing a treatise on pain and suffering as opposed to inter-
preting the passages on pain and suffering in the Bible. Both efforts would result in 
subjective appraisals that reflect the author's values, biases, cultural experiences, 
and methodology, but the latter hermeneutic assumes an authoritative source of 
information as a starting point. Although it is impossible to directly access the 
authoritative source without the subjective biases of human interpretation, the 
source nonetheless exists as a standard of truth. 
Thus, there are at least two distinctives to the hermeneutic of a Christian cogni-
tive therapist. First, it leaves room for an appreciation of constructivism. This 
requires one to recognize that all knowledge is contextual (Packer, 1985). Just as 
a good biblical scholar interprets a Scripture passage in light of the context of that 
passage, all interpretation of life experiences and values occurs in a sociocultural 
and interpersonal context. Furthermore, that which we discover through interpret-
ing events is inseparable from the context. Messer (1992; see also Woolfolk, Sass, 
& Messer, 1988) refers to the hermeneutic circle to describe this contextualism: 
just as a sentence can only be interpreted by the meaning of the words therein, so 
also we interpret the words in light of the sentence. The word is in the meaning, 
and the meaning is in the word. The parts can only be interpreted within the 
context of the circle, and the circle is dependent upon the parts for its definition. 
Similarly, knowledge cannot be separated from the knower, and the knower is 
shaped by the knowledge he or she has. 
Second, a distinctively Christian hermeneutic requires us to believe in an authori-
tative text. For example, God's character and Scripture are unchanging, authorita-
tive guides for living. Although any interpretation of these texts is construed, and 
therefore subject to numerous human distortions, the underlying authority of the 
texts is assumed. 
Many contemporary hermeneutic scholars share with Christian scholars the first 
of these distinctives, but not the second. They often emphasize interpretation to 
the exclusion of objective reality, and end up taking constructivism too far. Lundin 
(1993) concludes: "While contemporary hermeneutical theory may help the Chris-
tian to comprehend the power of modern schools of interpretation, it cannot be of 
much assistance in formulating an explicitly Christian response to questions about 
the validity of any particular interpretation (p. 252}." 
A Christian hermeneutic allows cognitive therapists to maintain the advantages 
of constructivism while specifically addressing the disadvantages. There are several 
implications for Christian cognitive therapy. 
First, consistent with a constructivist hermeneutic, the primary focus of therapy is 
meaning and not the accumulation or analysis of facts. There is room for agents of 
meaning, such as religious beliefs, in psychotherapy, regardless of whether those 
agents can be empirically or rationally verified. For example, if a client interprets 
abortion as immoral and is experiencing distress about a past abortion, Therapist A 
and Therapist B might respond differently. Therapist A requests logical proof that 
abortion is immoral and risks being insensitive to the meanings constructed by the 
client. Therapist B helps the client identify and clarity the meanings attached to the 
event. Therapist A communicates, "You have no logical proof that abortion is 
wrong, and you can stop feeling guilty. " Therapist B communicates, "Your distress 
is a function of your values. Your values are important to me, and they are impor-
tant to you because they shape the way you see yourself and others ." Notice that 
both interventions are cognitive, but only the second is constructivist. 
Second, because our hermeneutic leaves room for authoritative texts, we look to 
sources outside the client for truth. For example, scientific methods can be helpful 
in understanding rel igious experience (Foster & Ledbetter, 1987). Similarly, Scrip-
ture gives absolute moral values that exist as boundaries for human construction 
of meaning. Although different interpretive strategies lead people to different con-
clusions about Scripture, the interpretive process does not define morality. Rather, 
human construction limits an accurate understanding of an authoritative morality 
defined by God and described in Scripture. Moreover, the objective veracity of 
memories is important if Christian therapists are to implement religious principles 
such as forgiveness, repentance and restitution. 
Although these two therapeutic implications may appear contradictory at first 
glance, I do not believe they are. Just as hermeneutic theory and scientific princi-
ples can be compatible in psychology (see Meichenbaum, 1992), hermeneutic the-
ory and rel igious authority can be compatible for Christian therapists. We believe in 
constructivism enough to respect our cl ients' interpretations of life events, but we 
are aware of other possible interpretations because of our respect for other, more 
authoritative sources of meaning. Then we gently guide our cl ients toward a more 
comprehensive interpretation of their life events, being aware of potential misuses 
of our power as therapists and forthright about our hermeneutic schemes and 
underlying assumptions. In the previous example, the Christian cognitive therapist 
might listen intently to the client's interpretation of the past abortion, accept and 
empathize with that interpretation , but then gradually move the cl ient toward 
greater awareness of God's forgiveness and redemption. The therapy succeeds as 
the client learns to interpret her situation from several perspectives. 
Third, the assumptions of RET must be challenged before being imported into a 
Christianized form of RET. The goal of traditional RET is to assert greater control over 
one's life by dismissing ideas of a divine being. The goal of Christian maturity is giv-
ing up control to God. Christianity moves one toward a theistic social anthropology 
rather than a psychological g.nthropology (Anderson, 1992). Similarly, the nature of 
thoughts that have been labeled "irrational" or "dysfunctional" deserves careful eval-
uation. For example, some dichotomous thinking may be useful for those striving for 
Christian maturity (see Galatians 5:16-26). Moreover, some "irrational" beliefs may 
be an essential part of Christian growth. For example, Ellis and Greiger (1977) 
describe as irrational the idea that one needs someone stronger than oneself to rely 
on. This belief, irrational to some, is the essence of Christian devotion. 
Conclusion 
It would be impossible to do justice to complex philosophical systems in a short 
paper such as this. The complexities of constructivism go well beyond the scope of 
this discussion. Nonetheless, this brief overview shows some of the effects of post-
modernism's changing view of knowledge on RET. Constructivism has ushered in 
helpful changes for Christian therapists, but also dangers. A hermeneutic that 
assumes an authoritative structure for morality and human values allows for the 
benefits of constructivism within the confines of a distinctively Christian world-view. 
Although Christian forms of cognitive therapy have been developed (Johnson & 
Ridley, 1992; McMinn , 1992; Propst, 1980; Propst, Ostrom, Watkins, Dean, & 
Mashburn, 1992; Wessler, 1984), most tend to simply Christianize the tools used 
by Ellis and other pioneers of cognitive therapy. To date, none has been based on 
a distinctively Christian hermeneutic or a critical examination of the RET world-view. 
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